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ABSTRACT 
Successful roll-out of Digital Rights Management (DRM) solutions has the 
potential to transform the economics of pay television. This paper explains 
how a technology that is being developed as a potential solution to the 
challenge posed by the widespread theft of intellectual property (piracy) may 
ultimately support the development of new business models. These new 
business models could trigger a radical change in the sources of market power 
in the supply chain, increasing the bargaining power of content companies 
relative to vertically integrated platform operators.  The paper examines some 
of the regulatory challenges that the new business models and the new 
technology raise. 
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1. Introduction 
Anyone who legitimately consumes an information good3 or a digital media 
product, say, by viewing a DVD, by watching a sporting event on a pay per 
view basis or by downloading a music track to their i-Pod device, also 
consumes in parallel some form of content protection.  The form of content 
protection chosen by the content creator or distributor will typically depend 
on the nature and value of the underlying content. Content suppliers with 
low value content and few piracy concerns may rely on legal protection under 
copyright laws.  Suppliers with more valuable content may supplement legal 
protection with technological solutions. Consider, for instance the standard 
model of conditional access in pay TV which uses the encryption of television 
signals to restrict access of programming to paying customers.  In general 
there is heterogeneity of demand for content protection which results in the 
use of a wide range of non-mutually exclusive legal and technical solutions.   
 
As the growth of broadband Internet increases the potential for illegal 
access to, and exploitation of, content, and as the commercial value of that 
content increases, we expect a change in the balance of legal and technological 
solutions to protect intellectual property. Even as a case is made for adapting 
copyright laws to the new technological landscape,4 more sophisticated 
technological means of content protection are being developed. We believe 
that one such technological solution, Digital Rights Management (DRM), will 
become increasingly important for protecting digital content in the pay TV 
supply chain and in time is likely to supersede conditional access.  DRM 
describes a suite of software and hardware technologies that can be deployed 
to provide persistent end-to-end content protection.  
 
Our paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the potential impact 
of DRM on market power in digital pay TV.  As we aim to identify long term 
trends in a technologically dynamic area, our analysis can only be speculative.   
Following this introduction we provide some non-technical background on 
what DRM means and, using analogies from related markets, suggest new 
business models that may be feasible in the pay TV environment.  In Section 
3, we explain the roots of DRM development, which can be traced to 
measures taken to counter the illegal theft of intellectual property and many 
of the concerns about the potential that DRM has to strip consumers of their 
usage rights arise.  Following this, in Section 4 , we offer suggestions as to 
how we believe DRM may impact on the markets for intermediary services in 
the supply chain and in Section 5 we explore the potential impact of DRM on 
                                                 
3 Shapiro and Varian (1998) describe information goods as “anything that can be digitised”. 
4 See Congressional Budget Office (2004). 
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selected competition policy issues common to pay TV markets. Section 6 
concludes.    
 
 
2. Background to Digital Rights Management 
 
Digital goods are protected through a variety of methods. Copyright laws 
provide legal protection, but these require that the rights owner is alert to any 
breaches of those legal protections and is in a position to enforce those rights. 
Legal protection may be supplemented with simple technical barriers to easy 
duplication of content. For example, the deliberate use of faint type in printed 
documents makes it harder to produce perfect photocopies. As the 
commercial value of the digital content increases, and as the growth of the 
Internet increases the ease of illegal access, storage and distribution, we 
should expect that more sophisticated forms of protection will arise. Even as 
there is talk of the potential of quantum encryption (which involves utilising 
the principles of quantum mechanics to generate random light-based keys, 
rather than large numbers, to secure content),5 the content creation and 
delivery industries are concentrating on the shorter term development of an 
efficient system of DRM to provide end-to-end persistent technical protection 
for their content.    
 
DRM has been described as “a systematic approach to copyright protection for 
digital media”6, though this does not quite explain what DRM is, or how it 
might evolve in the future. From a technical perspective DRM encompasses 
“the description, identification, trading, protecting, monitoring and tracking of all 
forms of usages over both tangible and intangible assets.”7 More simply, DRM is a 
suite of solutions that allow for the technical identification and protection of 
intellectual property.  The technical protection allows the owner to monitor 
and control access to the protected content from the point of its creation to the 
end of its life. Usage rules embedded in the content ‘metadata’ can control 
how and by whom a particular piece of content can be exploited.  This control 
can include the designation of devices upon which the content can be 
consumed and, whether or not it can be transferred from one platform to 
another. It can, in theory, allow for differential charging for access based on 
the identity of the user, time of use or the device on which it is used.  This 
empowerment of content owners gives rise to a broader understanding of 
                                                 
5 See for example 
http://www.commsdesign.com/news/tech_beat/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=23901208. 
6 See the IT encyclopaedia web site, www.whatis.com. 
7 See Iannela, cited in Rump (2003).  
4  
DRM, which encompasses how intellectual property rights are managed and 
exploited in a digital environment.  
 
DRM technologies employ a number of discrete tools, which are combined 
in order to provide the kinds of functionality described above. The primary 
tools are briefly described in Table 1.  
 
Table1.  Some Common DRM Tools8 
Tool Purpose 
Secure containers Restricts access to those with authorisation 
Rights expression languages Establishes which users have access 
Content description Unique description of content for search 
purposes 
User ID Allows for the tracking of usage 
Authentication Determines an individual’s usage rights 
Fingerprinting/Watermarking Complementary tools allowing the originator to 
identify unauthorised use 
Payment Billing and payment mechanism 
 
 
The precise choice of tools in any DRM solution will depend on the 
purpose of the DRM and the nature of the content that is to be protected. 
Tools used to protect documents differ from those used to protect a 
Hollywood movie.  For instance, Adobe Acrobat is software that utilises 
secure containers to set permissions on how protected documents can be used 
and distributed. Copy Generation Management System (CGMS) comprises 
rights expression languages that control the ability to duplicate DVDs, as do 
copy management rules for DAT and minidisk players which are managed by 
a Serial Copy Management System (SCMS).  Similar tools underpin the 
Content Scramble System (CSS) in DVDs, which allows content owners to 
segregate markets geographically, by restricting usage of regionally-encoded 
DVDs to hardware specific to the regions.  
 
In addition to the threat posed by physical piracy, the growth of broadband 
has led to a growing online market for content, which requires appropriate 
DRM technologies to provide rights protection. For example, Apple’s 
successful online music retail service, i-Tunes, and AOL’s Musicstore service 
have extensive DRM, exploiting user ID, authentication and billing tools.  It is 
a form of DRM that prevents users of games consoles from also using them as 
conventional PCs. Tools such as watermarking and fingerprints are 
                                                 
8  For more detail, see Becker et al (2003) et al. 
5  
increasingly used by rights holders to trace illegal copies of content or to 
degrade the quality of the copied material.9   
 
The ability of the content owner to attach usage instructions to the 
metadata sent with the content enables greater control over the exploitation of 
the content.  The implications are obvious.  For example, while it may be 
technically feasible in the future for video content to be transferred from a 
Digital Video Recorder to a portable device, such duplication would deprive 
content owners from appropriating the value of the transfer to the user and 
possibly the potential value from the onward distribution of its content. This 
lack of appropriability is an obstacle to the development of business models 
based on transferable content and creates a clamour for legal impediments on 
technologies that enable transfers. DRM technologies can enable 
appropriability and provide the content owner with greater incentives to 
support new technological platforms.  
 
DRM also offers to reduce the transactions costs associated with the 
transfer of digital media. These typically include the costs of search, the costs 
of reaching a contractual agreement, monitoring exploitation of the acquired 
good and enforcing contractual terms, and together may be prohibitively 
large in some transactions. As transactions costs fall new business models 
become viable. 
 
The welfare benefits arising from the introduction of new products and the 
viability of new forms of exchange may be substantial.  For instance, in the 
case of the US telecommunications market, Hausman (1997) estimates that the 
welfare costs of Federal Communication Commission’s failure to introduce 
two new telecom products was approximately $2 billion.10 Amazon.com 
provides an example of the welfare impact of the emergence of a 
transformative entrant rather than a new product. Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith 
(2003) estimate that the increase in consumer welfare resulting from the 
introduction of online sales of books was between $731m and $1.03bn for the 
year 2000 alone. More than the effect of competition on retail prices, the gains 
in welfare came from the reduced cost to the consumer of searching and 
locating previously hard to find titles, and access to recommendations based 
on their identified preferences.  
 
In much the same way as Amazon.com, the transformative power of DRM, 
and its ability to support new pay TV business models for the exploitation of 
                                                 
9 See http://www.commsdesign.com/news/tech_beat/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=23901208 
for a recent discussion of watermarking technologies. 
10 Other works on the theme include Nevo (2003) and Petrin (2002)  
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existing content may lead to substantial welfare gains. For example, a Video-
on-Demand service with time-restricted usage could be a substitute for video 
rental, while a download service with unrestricted time usage could be an 
alternative to DVD sales.  The ability of a service provider to collate 
information on consumer preferences by monitoring usage could enable the 
retail service to make valuable recommendations about alternative content 
that the consumer may be interested in –  potentially generating welfare gains 
in much in the same way as is done by Amazon.com.    
 
 
3. Piracy 
 
The early development of many DRM technologies has been driven by 
growing concerns about piracy. The ease of illegal access to intellectual 
property via the Internet has become a major issue for both policy makers and 
content creators.  The inability of existing copyright legislation to prevent the 
mass downloading, distribution and physical copying of content has created 
the need for improved technological solutions.  However, there is a growing 
fear that increased reliance on DRM technology to combat piracy 
compromises the principle of fair use under conventional copyright law and 
may ultimately act to the detriment of society in general (see Lessig (2004) and 
Samuelson (2003) for good illustrations of the arguments).  
 
Many characteristics of digital media products make them particularly 
susceptible to illegal piracy. 
 
• Digital content good are non-rival in consumption.   
• Without recourse to technological solutions, digital content is non-
excludable.  
• The incremental cost of making a copy is insignificant relative to the 
fixed costs of making the original. 
• The cost of transporting and storing digital media products is negligible 
and declining with falling PC prices and Internet charges. 
• The cost of detecting piracy and tracing illegal use over the Internet is 
often high relative to the commercial value of the content. 
 
The cost structure, specifically the near-zero marginal cost of making 
copies, means that cost-based pricing is unlikely to recover the fixed costs of 
producing the first copy. In such environments, it may be rational to charge 
customers according to their individual willingness to pay. Prices would then 
differ across consumers. Not only is this discriminatory pricing commercially 
rational, in many cases it is also Pareto efficient.  The sequential release of 
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content through time-specific windows – say, the cinematic release of a new 
movie, followed by its release on pay TV, followed by release on DVD, and so 
on, is a common form of inter-temporal price discrimination. This sequential 
release strategy, when supported by copyright law, grants the content creator 
monopoly rights over the exploitation of the content within each release 
window.  
 
While this enables the content owner to set prices above marginal cost 
within each period, such pricing generates opportunities for profitable piracy. 
Illegal copying is hardly a new phenomenon, but digitalisation has made it 
possible to making near perfect quality copies at low cost. The Internet has 
enabled the low cost distribution of pirated content. The decentralised 
structure of the Internet makes it difficult to track usage of that pirated 
content, and since piracy often straddles many jurisdictions, it is costly to 
enforce legal action. The content creating industries face the risk that if 
pirated copies become a reasonable substitute for the legitimate version, many 
consumers will be reluctant to pay prices significantly above marginal cost. 
Rob and Waldfogel (2004) conducted a small-scale experiment to illustrate 
this: a sample of students reduced their expenditure on legitimate CDs from 
$126 per capita to $100 when offered the possibility of free downloads. If the 
results of this small scale experiment can be legitimately extrapolated, the 
production system underpinned by exclusion and price discrimination will no 
longer be sustainable. In the context of music file sharing this fear has been 
expressed by the Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and the Emerging 
Information Infrastructure (2000): “For publishers and authors, the question is, 
how many copies of the work will be sold (or licensed) if networks make possible 
planet-wide access?  Their nightmare is that the number is one.” 
 
Identifying the cost to the content industries of illegal piracy of its 
intellectual property is not a simple task.  At one level the download of an 
illegal film is a lost legitimate sale, so that the cost of the estimated 600,000 
movies illegally downloaded each day in the US could be valued in terms of 
lost revenue at the box office or in terms of lost DVD sales (Deloitte (2004)).  
However the analysis is not so simple. Not everyone who purchases or 
downloads an illegal copy would have bought a full-priced legitimate copy, 
so that valuing every lost sale at full price overstates the loss.  Additionally, 
not all sales might have been lost. Sometimes consumers sample music by 
downloading a track illegally, and subsequently purchase a legitimate copy of 
the album.  Hence it is not easy to quantify the cost of piracy to content 
owners.11     
                                                 
11 Deloitte (2004) estimate that the lost profits are in the range of $6bn to $7.5bn per year. 
Henning (2004) develops an econometric model to identify the variables that determine the 
8  
 
While piracy erodes the revenue of content owners, measurement of the 
impact of piracy on overall economic welfare is not easy. Against the loss of 
producer welfare, there is the possibility of an offsetting increase in consumer 
welfare.  Piracy lowers average prices, by enabling consumers the option to 
switch to a cheaper (although possibly inferior) version of the product. Piracy 
also extends the market: some consumers who were unable or unwilling to 
buy products at the full retail price can buy the cheaper (albeit illegal) pirated 
version  
 
And while piracy usually hurts producers, sometimes the loss may be 
partially or substantially mitigated through indirect appropriation of the 
value of pirated content. Besen (1987) provides an interesting example. A 
television channel may be able to charge higher fees for advertising if it can 
show that its content is being pirated: the additional viewer base may increase 
the attractiveness of the channel to advertisers. It may even be that the piracy-
driven increases in advertising revenue can more than compensate for the loss 
in carriage or subscription fees from piracy.  Liebowitz (1985, 2002) argues 
that publishers of periodicals realise that library copies of their content may 
be vulnerable to piracy through photocopying, but may be able to extract 
some surplus through higher charges for institutional subscriptions than for 
individual subscriptions. The libraries themselves may recover some of this 
through profitable pricing of photocopying.  Similarly, the application of a 
levy on blank recordable media like tapes, CDs and DVDs may be viewed as a 
means of indirect appropriation. In these scenarios the content creator can 
extract some of the surplus from the act of piracy, provided that the pirate can 
be identified and a mechanism for transfer can be imposed. If so, piracy 
underpins a form of price discrimination, and producer surplus may be 
higher than what is achievable in the absence of piracy. Although nice in 
theory, the inability to identify the pirate, establish the value of the copies that 
the pirate will produce and enforce the higher price makes indirect 
appropriation impractical in most cases (Liebowitz (2000)).  
 
The introduction of dynamic considerations provides for additional 
complications. Even when piracy of software results in lost revenue to 
producers, there may be offsetting benefits. This may happen if, for instance, 
there is an element of lock-in to a particular piece of software or a network 
effect surrounding the adoption of a particular standard. Students who use 
                                                                                                                                            
likelihood of piracy for a given movie. The model estimates the cost of piracy to the German 
film industry at $153m in 2003. With extrapolation, this would suggest a cost of $3.6bn for the 
film industry worldwide.  The gap between the two above estimates illustrates the difficulty 
in accurately estimating the cost of piracy to the film industry. 
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pirated copies of software are more likely to pay for newer versions of that 
software (as well as complementary products) later in life, if only because 
they are more familiar with its routines. Moreover, as future generations of 
the software are developed and marketed, the illegal copies of the earlier 
generation may serve to lock consumers into legitimate purchases of later 
generations. Similarly, pirated copies of an earlier (later) instalment of a part-
work, for example Star Wars or Lord of the Rings could serve to increase sales 
of legitimate copies of later (earlier) episodes.  Ultimately, the net effects of 
piracy are context specific. 
 
Traditionally, content owners have relied on a mix of technical and non-
technical means to minimise the adverse effects of piracy, including: 
• use of copyright law to deter piracy; 
• raising the costs of piracy, by making it expensive to replicate quality 
(Novos and Waldman (1987)); 
• bundling the IP asset with a complementary product that cannot easily 
be copied (Novos and Waldman (1987) and Besen (1987)); 
• lowering the potential return to piracy by offering discounted versions to 
compete with pirates on price and manipulation of the release window 
strategy. 
 
Going forward, technical solutions to piracy are likely to come to the fore. 
DRM is considered a key technical component for anti-piracy efforts, but as 
with any software it is susceptible to hacking. This is recognised in the 
drafting of the EC Copyright Directive (2001), which prohibits measures 
designed to circumvent technical protections measures such as DRM.12 This is 
crucial for rights owners.  Not only is the intellectual property protected 
through the power of the courts, but the technical measures deployed by 
rights owners to protect the intellectual property are also protected.     
 
The scope of protection provided to content owners through DRM differs 
from that provided by copyright law.  While copyright laws accord a degree 
of monopoly control over content, exceptions to the law are normally 
incorporated to remedy the potential for abuse of this monopoly award and to 
protect social interests.  The doctrine of first sale (also knows as the principle 
of exhaustion) serves to limit the exclusive right to distribution of the content.  
A consumer who purchases a legitimate item is entitled to sell, rent (in certain 
circumstances only), donate or share that item with others.  In so doing, the 
market power of the copyright owner is constrained by what amounts to a 
                                                 
12 Article 6 of the Directive provides the framework for the protection of such measures 
against acts of circumvention. 
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second hand market.  Secondly, what is generally known as the fair use 
doctrine enables certain classes of users to exploit the copyright protected 
content without the owner’s consent, where the specified usage is deemed to 
be in the public interest.  Although the doctrine is peculiar to US copyright 
law, it is mirrored in the laws of other territories.   
 
In contrast, DRM is a technical means of exclusion and requires explicit 
action from copyright owners before consumers can take advantage of the 
traditional exceptions provided for in law. DRM allows the owner to specify 
usage rules for each piece of protected content, restricting exploitation to a 
specified set of uses, whether it be read only, store for a certain time, edit, 
distribute a specified number of times or view only on specific devices.   
 
Indeed there are some who believe that the roll-out of DRM technologies 
grants copyright owners too much control over how their content is exploited 
and consumed (Samuleson (2003)).  These concerns are not new.13  However, 
as discussed above it is not clear that complete exclusion is always in the 
interests of copyright owners: limited piracy may be consistent with 
commercial advantage.  As Varian (1998) notes, the objective of content 
owners is to maximise the value of their content, not to maximise the 
protection. It is not therefore certain that the fears of many consumer lobbyists 
are justified.14 
 
While the European Commission has aimed to providing a comprehensive 
framework of protection for technical measures such as DRM, consumer 
interest groups have continued to challenge the scope and nature of the 
protection. As Table 2 shows, the legal situation remains uncertain. 
 
Looking ahead, content creators are increasingly likely to support the use 
of DRM technologies as a means of content protection.  The greater technical 
ability to protect content through DRM technologies may also enable content 
creators to manage more sophisticated windowing strategies, to introduce 
pricing structures that are more flexible and tailored to individual consumer’s 
demand.  Flexible pricing and price discrimination will allow content owners 
                                                 
13 The most significant decision in this regard is perhaps that which provided legal support 
for Sony’s introduction of the Video Cassette Recorder, which opined that the time-shifting 
enabled by the VCR amounted to fair use and therefore was not in breach of copyright law. 
(Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 
14 Additionally, the EU Copyright Directive reflects the view that parallel legislation on fair 
use and other exceptions will protect consumers.  However, where voluntary measures by 
rights holders are deemed to be insufficient then the Directive empowers Member States to 
take remedial action, subject to the requirements of national legislation on fair use.  
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to offer prices that more closely reflect individual consumers’ demand than is 
feasible today. This may support pricing to certain consumers that reduces the 
margin between the legitimate and the pirated product.  The increase in 
output that may also be facilitated may go some way to addressing concerns 
of consumer groups about access rights. 
 
Table 2. DRM and the Law: Some recent ambiguities 
Country Issue Summary 
UK The High Court held that modification chips allowing 
users to defeat DRM protections on Sony video game 
cartridges (which specify regional coding) were in 
violation of the Copyright Directive.15 
Spain A court upheld the consumers’ right to hack the same 
regional coding protections.16 
France The courts have forced EMI to withdraw copy-protected 
CDs from shops in response to complaints that the copy 
protection DRM prevented consumers from exercising the 
right to make private copies (Tribunal de Grande Instance 
de Nanterre (2003)). However, in another case the court 
refused to uphold a challenge to the right of a film studio 
to incorporate DRM protections on the DVD of  
Mulholland Drive (France Tribunal Paris (2004)) 
Norway In perhaps the most famous case, courts upheld the right 
of consumers to hack CSS, the DRM protection of DVDs, 
using DeCSS17 
Belgium A court ruled in May 2004 that consumers had no right to 
make personal copies of copyright protected material so 
had no right to hack DRM protections (Tribunal Bruxelles 
(2004)) 
 
 
                                                 
15 See http://news.zdnet.co.uk/hardware/emergingtech/0,39020357,39161307,00.htm. 
16 See http://www.geek.com/news/geeknews/2004Jul/bga20040723026148.htm. 
17 See http://www.linux-magazine.com/issue/28/WorldNews.pdf 
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4. Intermediaries: Management of Digital Rights 
 
The promise of security and control over how content is exploited across the 
supply chain is likely to have a significant impact on how content owners 
engage with consumers. While the public policy debate has focused on the 
issues of intellectual property and piracy in the recent past, the emergence of 
new business models for delivery of content will shift the policy debate 
towards regulatory and competition policy challenges arising from the new 
technologies. In particular the consequences of the new developments for the 
intermediaries in the supply chain will come under considerable focus. 
 
Content creators are heterogeneous in their approach to the distribution 
and retailing of their content.  While some control the process end-to-end 
(these may be viewed as conventional business-to-consumer operations), 
others merely license their content to others for distribution and retail (and 
thus are business-to-business operations). Traditional, free-to-air producers/ 
broadcasters, such as the UK’s BBC and ITV, are representative of the former 
model, while independent producers and film studios sit within the latter 
group. The different market models may reflect differences in the value of the 
content being distributed relative to the benefits in each case of using 
intermediaries to distribute the content.18  Where the transactions costs 
involved in using intermediaries are high relative to the value of the content 
then the end-to-end model will typically be favoured.    
 
Amazon and iTunes provide helpful illustrations of the role to be played 
by intermediaries in digital markets.  They exist as a result of imperfections in 
the market for the delivery of digital products and services, but have been 
able to establish a presence in the value chain as a result of entry barriers 
falling due to technology and DRM.  Although they operate in the Internet 
space, they may provide a useful precursor of the role of intermediaries in the 
broader digital chain and for pay TV in particular.   
 
Bailey and Bakos (1997) identify the four major functions of an 
intermediary as (1) the aggregation of supply and demand; (2) providing trust 
to transacting parties; (3) market making; and (4) matching buyers and sellers. 
In the context of pay TV, the typical vertically integrated platform operator 
can be seen to be offering bundles of those functions. Their intermediation 
services include the retailing of channel bundles (aggregation of supply and 
demand), the supply of conditional access and subscriber management 
                                                 
18 The determining variables in deciding whether to rely on intermediaries or to internalise 
the supply chain include transactions costs, scale and scope efficiencies, as well as asset-
specific efficiencies. 
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(provision of trust) and the provision of electronic programme guides 
(aggregation and matching). 
 
With the increasing penetration of both digital TV and broadband Internet, 
the recent interest in the economics of the digital supply chain is not 
surprising. In many of the supply chains studied in the recent literature the 
intermediary provides a matching role, putting consumers in touch with 
suppliers.  Bhargava and Choudhary (2004) explain the network effects at 
work in the supply of aggregation services by “infomediaries”.19  They use the 
example of Expedia.com, which allows consumers to browse and book 
holidays from a selection of suppliers, to explain how the number of buyers 
using a service will increase as the number of suppliers increases.  As they 
note, the “intensity of the aggregation benefit provided by an intermediary to 
buyers (sellers) is determined by market characteristics and the mix of 
information processing features made available to buyers (sellers).”  A similar 
network effect exists in the provision of electronic programme guides in pay 
TV and in the bundling of pay TV channels into retail packages.  In pay TV 
the platform operators will typically not provide a matching role, but will act 
as a wholesaler, in effect managing the transaction with the consumer on 
behalf of the content owner.    
 
The role played by platform operators in providing intermediate services 
will come under pressure as a result of the roll-out of DRM solutions in the 
pay TV supply chain. This pressure may be increased as the ability to deliver 
Internet- protocol based TV services over broadband lowers entry barriers at 
the intermediate levels.  In such an environment, the aggregation benefits 
could conceivably be supplied by the technology as well as by new entrants 
such as search engines, rather than by the existing players.   However, for the 
purposes of this paper we concentrate on the impact on the intermediate 
markets of a successful roll-out of DRM solutions.  Table 3 summarises how 
DRM solutions can substitute for functions that are currently provided by the 
platform operators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 See also Kaplan and Sawhney (2000), who explore the role of electronic intermediaries in 
the aggregation of demand and supply.   
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 Table 3.  DRM substitution for intermediary functions 
Role played by 
intermediary 
In what way is DRM a substitute? 
Provide transactional trust 
for consumer and producer 
DRM may be used to unlock content 
only after payment and to extract 
payment only when the content has 
been supplied 
Record transactional data DRM can allow the content owner to 
monitor content exploitation 
Protection against IP theft Access can be restricted only to 
those who pay 
Setting boundaries on fair 
use 
DRM provides a technical 
replacement for legal boundaries on 
fair use exploitation 
 
  
In effect, DRM may enable content creators to do without some of functions 
currently supplied by intermediaries. However, this potential 
disintermediation does not necessarily mean the content creators can do 
without intermediaries altogether. In the pay TV chain, the intermediaries 
shoulder the risks involved in dealing with end customers.    Even in the pay-
per-view window, perhaps the TV window where the consumers is “closest” 
to the content creator, the platform operators manage the risks involved in 
both retailing the product to consumers (subscription management, bill 
processing and marketing) and in licensing the content (estimating effective 
demand).  For this, intermediaries such as BSkyB are well rewarded.20  Where 
DRM can fulfill some functions of intermediaries – in particular the 
authentication of users/subscribers and the management of transactions 
across platforms – there is the potential for content owners to integrate down 
the supply chain to the relevant stages. However, the scope for the complete 
displacement of intermediaries is limited: 
• Brand awareness.  With the exception perhaps of Disney, perhaps there 
are few content companies with an established brand that consumers can 
identify with a particular genre of content.  Content creators would have 
to invest heavily in brand awareness.   
• Business model.  As most content creators operate as business-to -
business entities, downstream integration would require radical 
restructuring of their operations, including investment in consumer 
management at the retail level. 
                                                 
20 BSkyB reported profits of £154 million for the six months to December 2004. 
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• Aggregation.  Although advanced search techniques may reduce the 
value-added to consumers of aggregation undertaken by platform 
operators, the platform operator does provide scale and scope economies 
in the supply of content.   
 
In short, digitalisation, underpinned by DRM, will not automatically lead 
to the elimination of intermediaries in the pay TV supply chain.  We are more 
likely to see a change in the economics of the supply chain at the intermediate 
levels.  Some functions currently provided by the traditional intermediaries 
may no longer be necessary in the delivery of many of the new services.  In 
areas such as video on demand (and its variants) there may be less need to 
package content into channels as consumers will be able to search for content 
on a title by title basis or by genre.  The lowering of entry barriers in the 
intermediate markets, as a result of the potential for unbundling of services, 
means that there is scope for independent niche intermediaries, to compete 
with established players who will continue to provide bundled service.  For 
an illustration of what the future market structure could look like, consider 
Movielink, a joint venture between some leading Hollywood film studios.21  
Movielink offers broadband consumers the opportunity to download movies 
to their home PC or TV, either for immediate view or for storage. Search costs 
are low as consumers can select directly from a wide range offered by the 
studios involved in the joint venture. In effect, Movielink has enabled the 
studios to bypass the established intermediaries in a particular segment of the 
home movie viewing market. As the new intermediaries at the aggregation 
stage can expect to get regulatory support for gaining access to electronic 
programme guides, consumer search costs need not increase much as new 
players arrive in this market. Similarly, where content can be grouped by 
genre, new players can easily package their content in a well-defined offering.   
 
Where the genre is hard to define, leading to higher search costs, or where 
the transactions costs involved in managing multiple intermediaries are large 
relative to the value of the content, the traditional intermediaries are likely to 
retain some advantage in packaging content into discrete channels.  Here 
content owners would continue to benefit from the bundled service provided 
by intermediaries. Even here, the potential competition from the new entrants 
is likely to provide content companies with greater leverage with 
intermediaries.  
 
Where content is valued across multiple platforms, there may be greater 
scope for content creators to assume some intermediation functions using 
DRM. For example, consumers may wish to download a movie onto a DVR 
                                                 
21 www.movielink.com 
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and then transfer that to other devices. In such contexts it may be simpler to 
use multi-platform DRM enabling a single user authentication and billing 
system than transacting with multiple, platform-specific intermediaries.   
 
 
5. Implications for regulatory and competition policy 
 
Successful roll-out of DRM solutions in the pay TV supply chain is likely to 
transform the economics of pay TV. If so, it would require a change to the 
traditional case for regulatory intervention to constrain the potential for the 
abuse of market power in this market.  We focus on two underlying features 
of DRM in this context.22  Firstly, DRM provides a channel for secure, delivery 
of content through open distribution networks, and may allow content 
owners to bypass the existing pay TV channels built around proprietary 
platforms. More generally, the creation of an alternative delivery channel will 
alter the distribution of market power in the supply chain. Of course, the 
outcome will also depend on the market structure that emerges in the DRM 
technologies sector. Secondly, the increasing use of DRM in the delivery of 
content will have significant implications for the nature of pricing in these 
markets by altering the scope for price discrimination. We look at each of 
these issues in turn. 
 
a. DRM and Market Power in Pay TV 
Content 
acquisition and 
aggregation
Access provision User interface
Channel 
packaging, 
wholesaling  and 
retailing
Subscriber 
management
• Rights acquisition
• Channel building
• Content storage
• EPG/navigation services
• DVR functionality
• Interactive services
• On-demand services
• Network and carriage 
services
• Conditional Access 
Services
• Marketing
• Bundling of channel 
packages
• Retail distribution
• Wholesaling of 
channel bundles to 
downstream players
• Customer registration 
and installation 
services
• Ongoing customer 
support
• Customer billing and 
payment services
 
Diagram 1.  Illustration of a Hypothetical Digital Pay TV Supply Chain 
                                                 
22 Issues such as standardization, leverage of market power from related markets and patent 
pooling are beyond the scope of this paper, but are nonetheless important areas for research. 
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Diagram 1 provides a simple illustration of a digital pay TV supply chain.  
The key regulatory bottlenecks in the current supply chain are well known 
and have been subject to regulatory investigation (Competition Commission 
(1999) and OFT (2002)) and to academic scrutiny (Cowie and Williams (1997)).  
The market power of the platform operators is allegedly built around their 
exclusive access to valuable content through long-term contracts for premium 
sport and blockbuster movies. Vertical integration across proprietary 
conditional access services has also generated regulatory concern.  Despite 
several attempts to moderate the market power of the platform operators, 
using both ex ante regulation (of conditional access) and ex post competition 
law (in cases relating to access to and the licensing of sports and movie 
rights), the market power of large platform operators remains virtually intact, 
with little sign of effective potential entry.   
 
What are the sources of market power of the current pay TV platform 
operators? Pay TV operation requires considerable fixed investment to set up 
the technical infrastructure for programme delivery. Further, investment in 
editorial infrastructure is necessary to aggregate licensed content into 
channels and to develop own content. The first category of expenditure 
involves economies of scale while the latter involves economies of scope. Such 
a cost structure –  and the fact than many of the costs are in the nature of sunk 
costs – creates a tendency towards concentration.  Consider the relatively 
concentrated nature of most pay TV markets in Europe. Not surprising, even 
in countries with some competition between platform operators, there is 
considerable commercial pressure for consolidation.23 The scope for 
competitive entry in this sector is limited: entry usually requires an operator-
specific decoding device (the set-top box), which results in significant 
consumer switching costs and some element of lock-in.   
 
The diffusion of DRM solutions may challenge the market power of pay TV 
operators, and even ease some of the regulatory and competition policy 
concerns. DRM can enable the secure and exclusive delivery of content 
through open networks, and thereby obviate the need for proprietary 
networks built around encryption-based hardware. If DRM allows content 
owners to bypass conditional access, it is likely to weaken the market power 
of the current vertically integrated platform operators and strengthen the 
bargaining position of the upstream content owners/creators in the wholesale 
market for their content and channels. 
 
                                                 
23 As in Italy,  Spain and France. 
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To understand this, consider the market for the licensing of content rights 
for pay TV. Due to the relatively small number of buyers and sellers in this 
market, it is not a competitive market in the textbook sense.24 If there are 
multiple pay TV operators vying for a license, the content owner may choose 
to auction the rights. If there is only one pay TV operator that can credibly 
acquire the rights from a content owner – that is, if there is a bilateral 
monopoly – the terms of the license will be determined through negotiation 
between the licensor and licensee. While each party may prefer an outcome 
that maximises its share of the profit from the commercial exploitation of 
content, the outcome of the bargaining process would depend naturally on 
their relative bargaining strengths. For instance, if their bargaining strengths 
are equivalent, the agreed upon price will be mid-way between their 
individual positions in the event of disagreement. Of course, the outcome 
may be sensitive to the availability of outside options. For each player, the 
outside option refers to what player expects to get if they fall back on 
alternative opportunities in the event of disagreement in the bargaining 
process. In general, the availability of more valuable outside options is likely 
to improve a player’s payoff (and certainly cannot lower it) within the 
bargaining process.25    
 
A content owner is naturally attracted to the dominant pay TV 
platform/channel. The dominant channel may have considerable advantage 
over its rivals due to its larger subscriber base, its superior knowledge of 
downstream demand or its ability to package and promote the content better 
than other channels. The dominant operator can exploit these advantages and 
the related advertising potential to maximise the surplus to be shared 
between the licensor and licensee. A content owner’s outside options may be 
quite limited if rival pay TV operators have a small subscriber base and if 
there are no other channels for distribution of content.  In contrast, from the 
dominant channel/platform operator’s perspective there are few forms of 
content for which there are no credible substitutes. Typically they have 
stronger outside options.  This asymmetry of outside options implies that the 
bargaining outcome is likely to be favourable to the pay TV operator. It is in 
                                                 
24 Indeed, in extreme cases, the standard model of monopsony (monopoly) may be more 
appropriate. If there is only one credible content licensee (licensor), the single pay TV channel 
(content supplier) would set the price for the content in way that maximises its surplus. 
25 The ‘split-the-difference’ solution of Nash Bargaining assigns to each player a payoff equal 
to his disagreement point plus a share of the surplus that remains after disagreement payoffs 
have been made. If outside options are viewed as disagreement points, they affect the Nash 
bargaining outcome directly. In contrast, the outside option principle of strategic bargaining 
argues that outside options merely constrain the set of possible solutions. If so, an outside 
option affects the outcome only if it enables a player to improve on the outcome in the 
absence of that option. For a discussion see Binmore et al (1989), Muthoo (1999) and Osborne 
and Rubinstein (1990). 
19  
these circumstances that competition authorities, content owners and 
independent channels have raised concerns about the behaviour of the 
vertically integrated platform operators, alleging abuse of market power.   
 
The roll out of DRM can potentially alter the bargaining outcome. Content 
owners can threaten to use DRM technologies to distribute the content 
directly to their consumers and, in the process, bypass the primary 
bottlenecks and intermediary services of the pay TV platforms. Of course new 
distribution channels will need to reach agreements with the vertically 
integrated platform operator to secure access to the programme guide and to 
other technical access services for effective delivery of content. Over time, 
there is scope for unbundling of such intermediary services, so that DRM-
enabled delivery will become a credible alternative.  In terms of bargaining 
theory, DRM increases the outside option for the content owners. Where the 
outside option is credibly more profitable than the existing outcome for 
content owners, the emergence of this better outside option should enable 
content owners to improve on their bargain relative to pay TV platform 
operators. This is not to say that content owners will necessarily exploit the 
new outside options.  Rather the increased leverage that the new options 
provide can allow them to secure a greater share of the rent derived from the 
marketing their content via existing platforms.  
 
The recent history of auctions of television rights for Football Association 
Premier League (FAPL) matches suggests how the balance of bargaining 
power might shift. The FAPL has tried to suggest that it may launch its own 
channel if it cannot secure favourable terms from BSkyB26, but the threat has 
never been credible.  It is undermined by the fact that a channel owned by the 
FAPL would have to negotiate carriage with BSkyB, as well as access to the 
intermediary services provided by BSkyB and its related companies, and 
BSkyB would be in a strong position to appropriate the rents at that stage. If 
so, FAPL may be in no better position than if they had agreed to license the 
rights to BSkyB in the first place.  However if FAPL is able to license DRM 
solutions from a party other than BSkyB, the expected returns to FAPL from 
launching their own channel would be higher, and this enhanced outside 
option makes FAPL’s  threat to launch their own channel more credible.  
Similarly, film producers, particularly the major Hollywood studios, would 
benefit from having the outside option of retaining their own rights and 
developing their own distribution services as an alternative to licensing to a 
                                                 
26 See for example, http://www.advanced-television.com/2002/June10_17.html.  Peter 
Scudamore, CEO of the FAPL in 2002, said ʺNext time round, rather than sell our rights to a 
broadcaster for them to sell on to households, the Premier League may do a deal direct with 
consumers, so that you can ring up [the] PL and say ʺIʹd like to buy your Premier League 
channel with all the games on it for X pounds a month.ʺ  
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downstream channel operators.  Indeed, Movielink is an early example of 
how this might pan out. 
 
What are the implications of this for regulatory and competition policy? If 
the threat of DRM-enabled distribution channels is able to curtail the market 
power of the dominant pay TV platform operators, it would ease some of the 
current regulatory concerns. However, there are some caveats. The dominant 
position of pay TV operators may only partly be based on conditional access. 
It could also derive from their production and editorial functions, say those 
associated with the packaging of content into attractive channels that match 
subscriber preferences, or their reputation for innovative content production. 
While DRM can level the playing field in secure delivery of content, 
superiority in the editorial or production infrastructure will preserve some 
advantage for the current pay TV operators. In such circumstances, DRM will 
enable only limited displacement of the pay TV operators, more so for some 
categories of content than others. Regulatory policy may then focus on 
whether retention of these advantages requires regulatory oversight.  
 
It is possible that the greater deployment of DRM will only shift market 
power from pay TV operators to the upstream content owners/creators, 
without affecting the overall degree of monopoly power.  In many markets 
the current regulatory concern has been with the arrangements / market 
forms by which rights to content are transferred from content creators to pay 
TV broadcasters. If monopoly power migrates upstream, regulatory oversight 
will need to make an appropriate transition itself, to see if the growing 
dominance upstream is against the public interest. 
 
Further, it is possible that some market power might shift to the technology 
vendors that came to control the dominant DRM standard(s). It is conceivable 
that slight market advantages – real or perceived – could cause the market for 
DRM applications to tip in favour of one or two proprietary standards. If so, 
one bottleneck technology (proprietary DRM technology) would end up 
replacing another (proprietary platforms of pay TV channels), with no overall 
improvement from the consumers’ point of view.   
 
This scenario cannot be ruled out but is not a foregone conclusion. The 
outcome may well depend on many technological and strategic 
considerations. Entry in the DRM applications market might be easier than 
launching a pay TV platform, so that multiple DRM standards could 
potentially coexist in a competitive environment. Heterogeneity in patterns of 
demand for DRM may create scope for distinct categories of DRM 
applications. As different types of content are susceptible to differing degrees 
of piracy, content owners will seek different levels of protection.  For some, 
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current encryption technologies provide sufficient protection, while others, 
like blockbuster movies, might prefer persistent end-to-end protection.  For 
enterprise DRM (DRM designed to protect documents when there is shared 
access within the enterprise), methods akin to using faint type to make 
photocopying difficult might suffice.  It is plausible that the heterogeneity in 
demand will sustain a variety of DRM standards in the long run. If so, any 
sub-market within a spectrum of protection technologies might be 
contestable.   
 
The degree of interoperability between rival DRM applications will also 
affect the effective competition in this market. There will be pressure from the 
content industry for many of the different DRM solutions to be interoperable.  
Re-versioning content for different distribution platforms increases the costs 
of distribution, so that greater interoperability in DRM systems will allow 
them to reach more consumers at any given cost. The incentives for DRM 
operators to build in interoperability are more complicated. For one, 
interoperability increases the intensity of price competition between rival 
standards, so that restricting the degree of interoperability might be attractive. 
 
Overall while it is conceivable that the market for DRM standards may be 
concentrated, the heterogeneity of demand and the desire for interoperability 
of reception devices from the perspective of content suppliers is likely to 
restrain this tendency. Competition policy may need to maximise the 
possibility of a competitive outcome, at least in terms of pricing of DRM 
technologies. Regulatory policy may also need to guard against the possibility 
that existing pay TV operators may themselves acquire interests in DRM 
/DRM vendors in order to prevent the dilution of their market power.  
 
 
b. DRM, Pricing of Content and Consumer Welfare 
Pricing structures for premium content, particularly movies, display 
considerable price discrimination. This is hardly surprising. Given the 
technology of generating content – high fixed costs of producing the first 
copy, and near zero cost of subsequent copies – there is little reason for prices 
to be related to the marginal cost of production. Once that anchor is lost, 
pricing of content is likely to be related to consumers’ willingness to pay and 
thus may well involve different prices for different consumers. 
 
For price discrimination to work, a seller must be able to sort customers 
(that is, distinguish those who are willing to pay a high price from others who 
are not) and to segregate the market (so that those who are offered low prices 
cannot transfer the good or service to others facing higher prices). We argue 
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that DRM technologies potentially could enhance content owners’ ability to 
sort customers and to segregate markets, thereby increasing the scope and 
extent of price discrimination. DRM is likely to improve the precision of 
conventional price-discrimination strategies but also enable newer forms of 
price discrimination. Indeed it could be argued that the real impetus for DRM 
roll out comes not from concern about piracy, but from its potential for 
enhancing the value of intellectual property rights through more aggressive 
price discrimination.  
 
A common strategy in the market for cultural content involves inter-
temporal price discrimination (Caves (2001)). This relies on a simple attribute, 
impatience, to sort customers. Under the plausible assumption that those who 
are eager to watch a movie sooner are willing to pay more than those who are 
prepared to wait,27 the revenue-maximising price structure displays a 
trajectory with prices falling over time. For instance, a movie is first released 
in theatres; with some lag it become available on a Pay-Per-View basis and/or 
DVDs. Next it may be released on a pay TV channel and ultimately shown on 
free TV. The staggered release of the movie through a sequence of windows 
achieves a price trajectory that has prices falling as waiting time to access the 
content increases. Consumer expectations matter in this context.  If consumers 
thought that the content owners could not commit credibly to waiting six 
months after the theatrical release to releasing the DVD version, they might be 
less willing to pay the high price of the cinema version. The durability of 
content matters too. Blockbuster movies are generally regarded as more 
durable than sporting events, where the value to the consumer drops 
dramatically once the outcome is known (Cowie and Williams (1997)). 
Further, the segregation of the market into different windows is feasible only 
to the extent that leakage or piracy from one window does not undermine the 
revenue stream from subsequent windows. For instance, pirated copies 
created during the theatrical release would erode the revenue potential of the 
DVD and pay-per-view releases. Thus the optimal windowing strategy – for 
instance, the geographic extent and duration of release in each window and 
the price charged for that release –  depends naturally on a variety of practical 
commercial considerations.  
 
How does DRM improve the ability to charge discriminatory prices? 
Current windowing strategies allow only a handful of discrete windows, 
based on the delivery platforms (theatres, DVD, pay-per-view, etc).28 DRM 
                                                 
27 The assumption that those who are most impatient are also those who place the highest 
value on the content is not always valid.   
28 The gap that must be left between the windows to support the sequencing model has a cost 
in that the momentum of the movie’s marketing is stalled at each stage.  This may reduce the 
degree of self-generating publicity and require increased marketing spend. 
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can enable a finer partition of the access intervals – for instance, prices could 
be a continuous function of time elapsed since first release. By reducing the 
risk of leakage across windows, DRM can better segregate the different 
markets and can support higher prices in some windows.29 Both of these are 
likely to enhance revenue. 
 
Furthermore, DRM may allow the seller to discriminate access in 
dimensions other than just waiting time. In particular, where it is difficult to 
segment consumers according to exogenous characteristics, endogenous 
characteristics, such as the quality of the product being sold may be used to 
discriminate between consumers (Varian (1997)).  By pricing the different 
quality of products appropriately consumers can be incentivised to self-select 
the price- quality bundle that reflects their willingness to pay.  In this way, 
quality discrimination can be used to supplement price discrimination. A 
seller could discriminate between consumers who would like to watch a 
movie just once and those who are willing to pay for repeated viewings. A 
seller could restrict access by time of day or day of the week to distinguish 
between low-income students and busy executives. Similarly, a movie could 
be priced to discriminate between viewing technologies, with viewing in an 
HDTV format used as a proxy for a higher willingness to pay than viewing in 
standard definition. In terms of the conventional typology of price 
discrimination, a significant proportion of the current approach can be viewed 
as analogous to third-degree price discrimination or group pricing: 
observably different groups of people are charged prices based on group 
characteristics like demand elasticity. DRM may replace this with a richer 
menu of carefully constructed consumption bundles, forcing individuals to 
select a bundle most suited to their privately known preferences.  
 
At the same time, the ability of DRM technologies to monitor use may 
allow sellers to build better profiles of their consumers by tracking their past 
consumption patterns. While this may well conflict with privacy rules, it 
allows sellers to gain a better understanding of an individual’s willingness to 
pay, and thus sort its customer more profitably for future transactions. 
Amazon.com bases its approach to making recommendations to users on its 
ability to track past consumption choices.  It is not inconceivable that a similar 
approach could be taken to tracking consumption of audiovisual content 
within a pay TV environment. To the extent that prices can be conditioned on 
                                                 
29 To some extent the possibility of piracy is undermining windowing, as content released in 
one window is illegally transferred to consumers in ways that compromise the profitability of 
other windows. A rational reaction to this would be to increase prices in the early windows to 
compensate for compromised revenue in later windows, and possibly to compress the 
windows to reduce leakage of revenue streams (which we are seeing in regions where piracy 
is a major concern, such as Russia). 
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the history of consumption pattern, DRM may entail a step closer to the 
theoretical ideal for price discrimination, where every unit that a customer 
buys is charged at a price close to his willingness to pay. 
 
What are the welfare implications of these changes? First-degree price 
discrimination generally enhances efficiency. Even though some consumers 
end up paying higher prices than they would under non-discriminatory 
pricing, the expansion of the market by enabling sales to previously excluded 
consumers is likely to be welfare-improving.  
 
To understand this, imagine that consumers differ in more than one 
characteristic: their willingness to pay (one consumer is willing to pay more to 
see a James Bond movie than another) and their impatience (both would like 
to see the movie earlier rather than later, but one consumer is more impatient 
than the other). Windowing strategies exploit the typical correlation between 
these attributes, by selling at high prices to impatient consumers and low 
prices to patient ones.  DRM could enable finer sorting of consumers even 
when these characteristics are not correlated. It could make the movie 
available to all consumers at an early stage, matching individual prices to 
their individual willing to pay, thereby increasing welfare. DRM succeeds 
here because supplying the movie cheaply to this person does not necessarily 
interfere with charging a higher price to other consumers. From the 
perspective of competition authorities concerned about the effects on the 
potential for competition of the exclusive contracts necessitated by inter-
temporal price discrimination the alternative forms of price discrimination 
enabled by DRM may offer a more attractive market-driven outcome. 
 
Even though there are strong theoretical arguments that suggest that better 
forms of price discrimination can potentially be welfare improving, it must be 
recognised that it generates considerable antipathy from consumers. In some 
case, this even translates into calls for regulatory intervention.  Groups such 
as the Electronic Frontier Foundation30 have been particularly active in this 
regard, raising concerns about the potential for the breach of privacy rules, 
infringement of the consumers’ alleged right of fair use and the potential for 
content companies to constrain consumers use of content unfairly (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (2004)).What this activity illustrates is that not all parties 
in the supply chain agree that DRM provides the potential for an improved 
consumer experience.  The challenge faced by the content industry is more 
complicated than competing with freely available pirate copies.   
 
                                                 
30 www.eff.org 
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6. Conclusions and Implications 
 
Digital Rights Management may not be an entirely new concept, but the 
threat posed by piracy to the content industries, underpinned by the dramatic 
growth in broadband penetration, has brought debate on the technology and 
its implications to the fore.  We have sought to look beyond the current debate 
on piracy to briefly predict how DRM may impact on business models in the 
content supply chain, in particular how DRM may potentially lead to a 
refinement of the traditional, rather clunky, windows-based content release 
model.  What is clear is that DRM can cause an upheaval in the economics of 
the supply chain and a change in the way in which consumers access content, 
which may affect the way in which it is regulated.  It remains to be seen how 
the incumbent platform operators will respond, but DRM does have the 
potential to achieve what competition authorities and regulators have thus far 
been unable to do, namely to reduce the market power of the vertically 
integrated pay TV platform operators and reduce the barriers to entry at key 
stages in the supply chain.  The extent to which the pay TV bottleneck will 
simply be replaced by a DRM bottleneck remains to be seen, but the 
regulatory community will need to retain a close eye on this aspect of 
development.   
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